Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor and the Environment by Knox, John H.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2004
Separated at Birth: The North American
Agreements on Labor and the Environment
John H. Knox
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor and the Environment, 26 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
359 (2004).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol26/iss3/2
Separated at Birth: The North American
Agreements on Labor and the Environment
JoHN H. KNOX*
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)
and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) are similar in many ways, from the concerns that led to their
creation to the criticisms leveled against them. They are usually seen as
bookends to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
addressing parallel problems through virtually identical institutions, the
Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) and the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The agreements are less similar
than they first appear, however. Despite their common origins, they
reflect fundamentally different approaches to international organization.
On the surface, both reflect the traditional Westphalian view of
international law, which assigns states, represented by their national
governments, responsibility for creating and implementing law on the
international plane. Both modify the Westphalian model slightly by
focusing on issues of domestic governance that were traditionally
considered outside international purview. Only the NAAEC, however,
goes decisively beyond Westphalia by providing roles for
nongovernmental actors in the enforcement and further elaboration of
its obligations.
Part I of this Article describes the path international law is taking
from the strict Westphalian model, and Part II locates the NAAEC and
NAALC at different milestones along that path. Part III compares the
* Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. In 1993, as
an attorney-adviser at the U.S. Department of State, I participated in the negotiation of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation and, to a far smaller degree, in the
preparation of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. I have chaired the U.S.
National Advisory Committee on the Commission for Environmental Cooperation from 1999 to
2001 and from 2003 to the present. This Article represents my personal views, which do not
necessarily or always coincide with those of the U.S. government, the CEC, or the National
Advisory Committee.
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four compliance mechanisms created by the agreements. Their record
supports the argument by many scholars that providing
nongovernmental actors with access to international compliance
mechanisms is a more effective way to promote compliance with
environmental and labor norms than is the traditional method of relying
on intergovernmental claims. The most effective of the four
mechanisms is the CEC citizen submissions procedure, which is also the
only one that allows nongovernmental actors to raise claims of
noncompliance directly to an impartial international body. Part IV
concludes by urging labor and environmental advocates to recognize the
relative success of the NAAEC and work to build on its provisions.
I. WESTPHALIA AND BEYOND
The traditional, Westphalian view of international law is that
national governments are the only legitimate actors on the international
plane; nongovernmental actors have no role to play there, and their
interests can be considered only to the extent that they are attributed to
or espoused by their government. When the Treaty of Westphalia was
signed in 1648, this approach reflected the predominant form of
domestic government: because autocratic rulers had sole sovereignty
within states, they naturally assumed the sole right to speak on behalf of
their states externally. In recent decades, however, as some form of
liberal democracy has displaced autocracy in most countries, the two
fundamental ideas of liberal democracy-that states should be governed
by the demos and that individuals have rights that must be respected by
their government-have gone from being the manifesto of
revolutionaries to the dogma of almost every state in the world, even
those whose-rulers still cling to autocracy. This sea-change is having
two important effects on international organization.
First, international law now recognizes the value of liberal
democratic principles in domestic governance. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the two international covenants on
human rights describe individual rights that governments may not
violate. Democracy itself now appears to be on its way to becoming an
obligation of international law.' International institutions from the
United Nations Human Rights Commission to the World Bank
increasingly encourage states to bring their domestic regimes into
accord with these principles. These changes modify the traditional
1. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46, 46-47 (1992).
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Westphalian model, which does not concern itself with states' domestic
governance. 2 By themselves they do not affect the fundamental nature
of international law, however, since they leave its creation and
implementation under the control of national governments speaking on
behalf of their states.
A possible second response to the growth of liberal democracy is
to incorporate liberal democratic principles directly into international
institutions, by allowing individuals and other nongovernmental actors
to participate directly in the creation and enforcement of international
law. As nongovernmental actors have become accustomed to
participating in domestic government, they have begun to expect, and to
press for, opportunities to participate in international organizations.
Many scholars have applauded this more basic challenge to the
Westphalian model. They argue that increased participation by
nongovernmental actors on the international plane has several
advantages: it is fairer, since it allows those most affected by
international policies to seek to influence them directly; 3 it increases the
variety and depth of information and ideas available to international
decision-makers; 4 and it is likely to be more effective at promoting
compliance with international norms, since nongovernmental actors are
willing to push for compliance more strongly than national
governments.5
In particular, public participation in international institutions may
increase the likelihood that international institutions will do more than
pay lip service to liberal democratic values in domestic governance.
Although governments have adopted universal human rights accords,
they virtually never bring international claims on behalf of the nationals
of another country. Allowing individuals to have direct access to
international institutions may provide a way to avoid this governmental
resistance.
2. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Rogue Regimes and the Individualization of International Law,
36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 816 (2002). According to the Westphalian formulation, "what
sovereign governments did within their own borders was of no concern to their neighbors. States
were the subjects of international law; international law regulated only political and economic
relations between states, not within them." Id.
3. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 480
(Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
4. Kenneth W. Abbott, "Economic" Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving
Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 1007-08 (1996).
5. See Laurence Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 387 (1997).
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Governments often oppose substantial public participation in
international regimes. Autocratic governments inherently dislike sharing
their power with the public, but even liberal democratic governments
often resist greater public participation on the international plane. They
may believe that additional voices in international institutions are
unnecessary because liberal democratic governments may be trusted to
speak for their people, or that public participation at the international
level may upset political balances already satisfactorily struck
domestically.
6
Nevertheless, some international institutions now provide
important opportunities for public participation. Those that have
progressed the furthest are in the fields of human rights and
international investment. In institutions such as the Human Rights
Committee and the International Labour Organization, and through
investment treaties such as Chapter 11 of NAFTA, nongovernmental
actors have formal roles in monitoring state compliance with
international obligations and may even bring claims of noncompliance
on their own behalf against governments. In most other areas, however,
nongovernmental actors have been much less successful in obtaining a
meaningful degree of participation.
II. MILESTONES ON THE ROAD FROM WESTPHALIA
The NAALC and the NAAEC are important milestones along the
road from Westphalia. Both modify traditional Westphalian elements by
recognizing and encouraging liberal democratic principles in domestic
governance. But only the NAAEC allows nongovernmental actors to
participate directly on the international plane. The following sections
describe first the common elements of the two agreements before
turning to their fundamentally different approaches to public
participation.
A. The First Milestone: Shared Modifications to Westphalia
The agreements arose from parallel concerns about the effect of
NAFTA on labor and the environment, and their responses to those
6. These concerns may be lessened to the degree that the interests sought to be pursued by
the nongovernmental actors are considered rights, and therefore less subject to balancing away
through either a domestic or an international political process. In that case, allowing public
participation and domestic scrutiny is consistent with the premise of liberal democracy that some
rights cannot be overcome even by the majority. Of course, it is often difficult to find agreement
on which interests meet these standards.
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concerns closely resemble one another. In particular, they have similar
obligations, institutions, and provisions for intergovernmental dispute
resolution, all of which amend the Westphalian model by focusing
attention on issues of domestic governance.
1. Underlying Concerns
In the early 1990s, activists and scholars criticized the proposed
NAFTA on labor and environmental grounds. One set of criticisms
concerned potential conflicts between international trade agreements on
the one hand and domestic laws restricting trade for environmental or
labor purposes on the other. This concern was sharply felt in the
environmental community after the infamous Tuna-Dolphin case, in
which an arbitral panel held that U.S. import restrictions on tuna aimed
at minimizing dolphin by-catch were in violation of U.S. obligations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.7 Although the
decision was not adopted by the GATT parties and therefore had no
legal effect, its reasoning suggested that several other U.S. laws
restricting trade on environmental grounds might conflict with GATT.
By extension, the Tuna-Dolphin reasoning also called into question U.S.
laws restricting trade on labor grounds.8 NAFTA appeared to reproduce
the GATT provisions on which the Tuna-Dolphin panel had relied.
A second joint source of concern was the U.S.-Mexico border
region, especially the maquiladoras that had arisen as a result of a
Mexican policy designed to encourage foreign investment in factories
built along its northern border. Environmentalists argued that rapid
industrial growth had overwhelmed water and waste facilities, and labor
activists accused the factories of mistreating workers. 9 Both groups
7. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report, United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155, 205 (1993), reprinted in 30 1.L.M. 1594,
1623 (1991).
8. For example, the Trade Act of 1974 § 301(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (2000), authorizes the
U.S. Trade Representative to impose trade sanctions on a country if he or she determines that its
acts, policies, or practices are "unreasonable" and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. The term
"unreasonable" is defined to include acts, policies, and practices which constitute a persistent
pattern of conduct that denies workers the right of association, denies workers the right to
organize and bargain collectively, permits any form of forced or compulsory labor, fails to
provide a minimum age for the employment of children, or fails to provide standards for
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health of workers. 19 U.S.C.
2411 (d)(3)(B)(iii).
9. See David Voigt, Note, The Maquiladora Problem in the Age of NAFTA: Where Will We
Find Solutions?, 2 MINN. J. GLoBAL TRADE 323, 327-29 (1993); Patrick McDonnell, Mexico
Faces Free Trade with High Hopes and Skepticism, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1991, at Al, A24.
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cited the maquiladoras as examples of the problems that result from
freeing trade without simultaneously improving social protections.
A third set of parallel concerns was that companies in the United
States would be drawn to Mexico to take advantage of its relatively low
labor and environmental standards. Ross Perot famously characterized
the attraction of Mexico's low wages as the "giant sucking sound."'
Similarly, environmental activists said that Mexico would become a
"pollution haven" for companies seeking to avoid the high costs of
compliance with U.S. environmental laws. i1
These criticisms were debated during the 1992 presidential
election, which occurred after NAFTA had been negotiated but before it
had been approved by the U.S. Congress. As Perot attacked NAFTA
and President George H.W. Bush defended it, Bill Clinton found middle
ground, promising to support ratification of NAFTA only if it were
accompanied by side agreements addressing labor and environmental
concerns. 12 Once in office, the Clinton Administration focused on the
second and third concerns, those that did not require reopening NAFTA
itself. To address the problems along the U.S.-Mexico border, it reached
a bilateral agreement with Mexico to increase funding for
environmental infrastructure in border communities. 13 To address the
differences between Mexican and U.S. labor and environmental
protections, it sought trilateral agreements requiring all three NAFTA
parties to have high domestic standards. Those agreements became the
NAAEC and the NAALC.
14
2. Central Obligations
By the spring of 1993, when negotiation of the trilateral
agreements commenced, NAFTA critics and government officials
understood that, as written, Mexican standards were not weaker than
10. Rich Thomas, More Winners Than Losers, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at 30.
11. Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA 's Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable
Development?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 423, 428 (1995).
12. "Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at the Student Center at North Carolina State
University," reprinted in NAFTA & the Environment: Substance and Process 263 (Daniel
Magraw ed., 1995).
13. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border
Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, Nov. 18,
1993, T.I.A.S. No. 12516, reprinted in 32 .L.M. 1545 (1993).
14. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]; North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
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U.S. standards in most respects. In general, Mexican labor law appears
more protective of workers' rights than U.S. labor law. 15While Mexican
environmental law is weaker than U.S. law in some areas, a team of
U.S. government officials had concluded after visiting Mexico that the
"Mexican and U.S. environmental protection regimes as a whole are
designed to achieve, when implemented and enforced, comparable
levels of environmental protection."'16 Attention therefore shifted to the
sizeable gap between the Mexican standards on paper and their
implementation in practice, and the negotiations focused on closing that
gap by improving compliance with domestic laws.
The core obligations of the agreements that emerged in the early
fall of 1993 reflect this emphasis. Each agreement includes a firm
commitment by the parties to "effectively enforce" their domestic
environmental or labor laws. 17 To avoid the possibility that the
governments might gut this obligation by weakening their domestic
standards, the agreements also require each party to ensure that its laws
provide for high levels of environmental protection and for high labor
standards, and to strive to continue to improve those laws.'
8
These obligations reflect and promote liberal democratic values in
the three countries. Although effective enforcement of these laws may
not appear to be an obvious element of liberal democracy, it necessarily
follows from the idea that government serves the people. Environmental
and labor laws are intended to further the general welfare, but they can
be effective only if they are effectively enforced.
Each agreement also contains obligations that more obviously
encourage liberal democracy. For example, the labor agreement sets out
15. Mark J. Russo, NAALC: A Tex-Mex Requiem for Labor Protection, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-
Am. L. REv. 51, 71-108 (2002); Stephen F. Befort & Virginia E. Cornett, Beyond the Rhetoric of
the NAFTA Treaty Debate: A Comparative Analysis of Labor Employment Law in Mexico and the
United States, 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 269, 269 (1996).
16. Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Evaluation of
Mexico's Environmental Laws, Regulations and Standards (Nov. 5, 1993), in NAFTA & THE
ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 583, 615 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995). See also Anne
Rowley, Mexico's Legal System of Environmental Protection, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10431 (1994)
(providing a general overview of Mexico's environmental legal system and concluding that
Mexico has established the foundation of a credible legal framework which, if fully enforced, can
provide relatively high levels of environmental protection).
17. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 5(1), at 1483-4; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 3(1), at 1503.
Each agreement also makes clear that a party has not failed to effectively enforce its law where
the action or inaction in question reflects a reasonable exercise of official discretion or results
from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect of other
environmental/labor matters determined to have higher priorities. NAAEC, supra note 14, art.
45(1), at 1494; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 49, at 1513.
18. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 3, at 1483; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 2, at 1503.
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basic labor protections, including freedom of association, the
prohibition of forced labor, and the elimination of employment
discrimination, that the parties are committed to promote in their
domestic laws. 19 Both agreements also promote public participation in
domestic legal procedures, by obliging each party to ensure that
interested persons may request competent authorities of the party to
investigate alleged violations of the environmental/labor laws, and that
persons with a "legally recognized interest" have "appropriate access" to
administrative or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the
domestic laws.20
3. New Institutions
The institutions created by NAAEC and NAALC appear
traditionally Westphalian on the surface: they are each governed by a
Council composed of the environmental/labor ministers or their
designees, 21 and each includes a Secretariat of international civil
servants with a general mandate to support the Council. 22 The NAALC
also requires each party to establish a National Administrative Office
(NAO) to serve as a point of contact with the other parties and the CLC
Secretariat.23
Each agreement gives its Council broad mandates to promote
cooperation among the state parties. The CLC Council's authority is
discretionary and, on the whole, very general. The NAALC lists many
labor issues on which the Council can promote cooperative activities,
but lists no mandates for which it is required to take action.24 The
NAAEC is much more specific, and lists mandatory as well as
discretionary provisions. 25 Both agreements also include catch-all
clauses that allow each Council to consider matters other than those
explicitly listed in the agreement.26 The effect is to authorize the
19. NAALC, supra note 14, ann. 1, at 1515.
20. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 6, at 1484; NAALC, supra note 14, arts. 3(2), 4, at 1503.
21. The NAALC explicitly refers to "labor ministers." NAALC, supra note 14, art. 9(1), at
1505. Because the U.S. government had not yet decided at the time of the negotiation that its
delegate to the CEC would be the administrator of the EPA, the NAAEC refers more generally to
"cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the Parties." NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 9(1), at
1485.
22. NAAEC, supra note 14, arts. 8(2), 11(5), at 1485, 1487; NAALC, supra note 14, arts.
8(2), 13(1), at 1504, 1506.
23. NAALC, supra note 14, arts. 15(1), 16(1), at 1507.
24. Id. art. 11, at 1505.
25. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 10, at 1485.
26. Id. art. 10(2)(s), at 1486; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 1 l(l)(p), at 1505.
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Councils to consider virtually any labor or environmental issue of
interest to the state parties.
So far, so Westphalian. But the agreements modify the
Westphalian model by authorizing the institutions to promote more
effective domestic governance. Each Council has authority to oversee
the implementation of its agreement, which necessarily includes
implementation of the core obligation to effectively enforce domestic
laws.27 The CLC Council may promote cooperative activities on
"employment standards and their implementation" and "the provision of
technical assistance, at the request of a Party, for the development of its
labor standards., 28 The NAAEC instructs the CEC Council to encourage
effective enforcement by each party of its domestic environmental laws
and to strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of
those laws. 29 Moreover, each agreement promotes greater public
participation in the formation of domestic policies concerning labor and
environmental issues by encouraging each party to establish a National
Advisory Committee to advise it on the implementation and further
elaboration of the agreement.
30
4. Intergovernmental Dispute Resolution
Part Five of each agreement establishes a dispute resolution
procedure.31 This procedure is traditionally Westphalian in that it may
be triggered by, and directed against, only the state parties,32 but it again
modifies the traditional approach by focusing on effective enforcement
of domestic laws. Specifically, these Parts provide that if certain
conditions are met, an arbitral panel may determine whether a party has
engaged in a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce a labor or
environmental law.3 3
A state party may begin the dispute resolution procedure by
formally requesting consultations with another party regarding whether
27. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 10(l)(b), at 1485; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 10(1)(a), at
1505.
28. NAALC, supra note 14, art. 1 l)(j), (o), at 1505.
29. NAAEC, supra note 14, arts. 10(3), 10(4), at 1486.
30. Id. art. 17, at 1486; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 17, at 1507. The NAAEC also
authorizes the parties to create Governmental Advisory Committees composed of representatives
of federal and state or provincial governments. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 18, at 1489.
31. NAAEC, supra note 14, pt. 5, at 1490-3; NAALC, supra note 14, pt. 5, at 1509-13.
32. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 22, at 1490; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 27, at 1509.
33. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 28(3), at 1493; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 33(3), at 15 10-
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it has persistently failed to effectively enforce its law.34 If the
consultations fail to resolve the issue, then a party may request a special
session of the appropriate Council, which must promptly convene to try
to resolve the dispute.35 If the Council fails to resolve the dispute within
sixty days, then the party may request the Council to convene an arbitral
panel to consider the matter. The Council may convene a panel only if
two of the three parties agree.36 If the panel concludes that the accused
party has engaged in such a persistent pattern of failure to effectively
enforce its domestic laws, the disputing parties have an opportunity to
agree on a mutually satisfactory action plan.37 If they do not agree on an
action plan or on whether an action plan is being fully implemented,
then the arbitral panel may establish an action plan. It may also impose
a fine on a party if the panel decides that the party has failed to enforce
its law.38 If the party fails to pay the fine within six months of its
imposition, the complaining party may suspend NAFTA benefits up to
the amount of the fine.39
Under the NAALC, a party may trigger the procedure only if the
subject matter of its allegation has already been addressed in a report by
an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE).40 Any party may obtain
review by an ECE, which is composed of three independent labor
experts, but the review is limited to enforcement of specified labor
protections: the prohibition against forced labor, protections against
child labor, minimum wages and overtime requirements, the elimination
of employment discrimination, protection of migrant workers, and
prevention of and compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses.
An ECE may not examine allegations concerning the rights to organize,
bargain collectively, and strike.4' Moreover, the only claims a party may
34. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 22(1), at 1490; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 27(1), at 1509.
35. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 23(1), at 1490; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 28(1), at 1509.
36. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 24(1), at 1490; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 29(1), at 1509.
37. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 33, at 1492; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 38, at 1511.
38. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 34, at 1492; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 39, at 1511. The
fine, called a "monetary enforcement assessment," is to be paid to the Commission and used by it
to improve enforcement of the environmental or labor law in the losing party. NAAEC, supra
note 14, ann. 34, at 1496; NAALC, supra note 14, ann. 39, at 1516.
39. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 36, at 1493; NAALC, supra note 14, art. 41, at 1512. These
trade sanctions may not be imposed against Canada. Instead, Canada agreed to allow the
Commission to enforce a panel's action plan and fine directly against the federal or provincial
government concerned. NAAEC, supra note 14, ann. 36A, at 1496; NAALC, supra note 14, ann.
41A, at 1507.
40. NAALC, supra note 14, art. 27(1), at 1509.
41. NAALC, supra note 14, art. 23, at 1508. To be the subject of an ECE review, the matter
must also be "trade-related" and covered by mutually recognized labor laws in each of the parties.
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bring to formal NAALC dispute resolution are those concerning
ineffective enforcement of a party's occupational safety and health,
child labor, or minimum wage labor standards.42
The NAAEC has neither limitation. There is no prerequisite
equivalent to the requirement for an ECE report, and a request for
arbitration may concern failure to effectively enforce any environmental
law.43
B. The Second Milestone: Beyond Westphalia
The modifications to the Westphalian model described in the
preceding section do not touch the central tenets of that model: that the
only actors allowed on the international plane are states and that
national governments are their only valid representatives. While both
agreements share those modifications, the NAAEC goes further in two
respects.
First, the NAAEC creates a Joint Public Advisory Committee
(JPAC) composed of citizens from the three North American countries,
which may advise the Council on any topic within the scope of the
agreement. Second, the NAAEC allows private citizens and
organizations to promote compliance with the core obligation of the
Id. art. 23(3). The former term is defined so broadly as to be virtually certain always to be met;
Article 49 provides that it means "related to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or
sectors that produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or
(b) that compete, in the territory of the Party whose labor law [is alleged to have been
ineffectively enforced] with goods or services produced or provided by persons of another Party."
To be covered by "mutually recognized labor laws," laws of both concerned parties must "address
the same general subject matter in a manner that provides enforceable rights, protections or
standards." Id. art. 49(1), at 1514. The purpose of this provision seems to have been to avoid
reviews of the enforcement of standards unless both parties had enacted laws in the same general
area. As a further protection against isolating any one party, the NAALC provides that the ECE is
to analyze patterns of enforcement by all three parties as they relate to the matter. Id. art. 23(2), at
1508. To that end, it may take into account information from the public as well as the parties. Id.
art. 24(l)(d), at 1508.
42. Id. art. 27(1), at 1509. In other words, the dispute resolution procedure may not review
allegations concerning the prohibition against forced labor, employment discrimination, or
migrant workers, all of which may be the subject of an ECE report, as well as allegations
concerning the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike, which may not even be
considered by an ECE.
43. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 22(1), at 1490. The term "environmental law" is defined
broadly. Id. art. 45(2), at 1495. To take the claim to arbitration, the alleged persistent pattern
must also "relate[ ] to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce
goods or provide services: (a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete, in
the territory of the Party complained against, with goods or services produced or provided by
persons of another Party." Id. art. 24(1), at 1490. In practice, this requirement, like the equivalent
criterion in the NAALC, should be easy to meet.
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agreement by filing citizen submissions with the CEC Secretariat
alleging that a state party has failed to effectively enforce its domestic
environmental law.44 The procedure may result in investigative reports
known as factual records.45
These openings for public participation are far from true
international liberal democracy.46 The role of JPAC is strictly advisory
and the citizen submissions procedure cannot force the governments to
comply with their legal obligations.47 Moreover, both are subject to the
ultimate control of the governments, which appoint the members of
JPAC and decide whether to authorize and publish factual records.
Nevertheless, JPAC and the submissions procedure make the NAAEC
virtually unique in international environmental law and the CEC highly
unusual among all international institutions. They represent a long step
down the road away from Westphalia. This section examines each in
turn.
1. Public Participation in International Legislation: The Joint Public
Advisory Committee
Although the Councils of the CEC and the CLC are not legislatures
in any usual sense, they are able to make decisions that bind their
institutions and to recommend courses of action to the parties. In that
sense they are the legislative organs of the organizations. Like most
international agreements, the NAALC leaves the international
legislative process entirely to the governments. It does not even provide
that CLC Council meetings must be open to the public, much less give
the public any voice into Council decisions other than through their
national governments. The NAAEC, in contrast, requires the CEC
Council to hold public meetings in the course of all of its regular
sessions and to make all of its decisions and recommendations public.48
Other international institutions have gone this far. But the NAAEC
goes much farther, by creating a fifteen-member JPAC as one of the
three constitutive elements of the CEC, together with the Council and
44. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 14, at 1489.
45. Id. art. 15.
46. For a proposal for a more sweeping move toward liberal democracy at the international
level, see Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2000).
47. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 16, at 1489.
48. Id. arts. 9(4), 9(7), at 1485. The Council may decide not to make a decision or
recommendation public if it so agrees by consensus. Id. art. 9(7).
[Vol. 26:359
Separated at Birth. The NAALC & NAAEC
the Secretariat. 49 JPAC has very broad mandates: to "provide advice to
the Council on any matter within the scope of this Agreement... and
on the implementation and further elaboration of this Agreement," and
to "provide relevant technical, scientific or other information to the
Secretariat. '" 50 JPAC also has a large degree of autonomy. It chooses its
own chair, who may call meetings without Council approval as long as
a majority of JPAC members concur.5'
While the governments retain an important measure of control over
JPAC through their power to appoint its members,5 2 they have not
"packed" JPAC with members certain to support their positions.
Although they have appointed some ex-govemment officials, for the
most part they have named a diverse roster that includes academics,
heads of environmental organizations, and business executives.
53
These individuals have taken seriously their responsibility to
provide independent advice. John Wirth, one of the initial U.S.
appointees to JPAC, has written that at its very first meeting, in July
1994, the members "chose to interact as North Americans rather than
see themselves as advocates or defenders of national positions or as
representatives of any particular private voluntary organization or
interest group. 5 4 Remarkably, their independence has not prevented
them from reaching consensus; to date, their advice has always been
issued unanimously. Former EPA Administrator Carol Browner, who
was the U.S. member of the CEC Council for its first seven years, has
said that this unanimity has been critical in influencing the Council:
"[B]ecause JPAC talked with one voice, it was a voice ministers had to
listen to."
55
The Council may have to listen to JPAC advice, but it does not
have to follow it. JPAC has been unable to convince the governments to
increase their fiscal contributions to the CEC, for example, or to
conclude their long-standing negotiations on a North American
49. Id. art. 8(2).
50. Id. art. 16(4), 16(5), at 1489.
51. Id. art. 16(2), 16(3).
52. Id. art. 16(1). If the party decides, it may allow its National Advisory Committee to
appoint the members of the JPAC. Id.
53. For a list of all of the members appointed through early 2003 and a description of many
of their backgrounds, see John D. Wirth, Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee, in
GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
199, 209-10, 212-13 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) [hereinafter Wirth,
Perspectives on JPA C].
54. Id. at201.
55. Id.
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agreement on transboundary environmental assessment.56 Nevertheless,
John Wirth describes several instances where JPAC has affected CEC
policyi 7 Perhaps most importantly, JPAC has consistently championed
the citizen submissions procedure, as described below in Part III.
Public participation through institutions like JPAC is far more
likely to produce meaningful results than simply allowing public
interventions at meetings of government officials, for several reasons.
Over time, the JPAC members become experts on many aspects of CEC
policy. They also become knowledgeable at conducting public meetings
and synthesizing the input that they receive. The ministers know that
JPAC members will continue to be engaged in issues they raise, and that
they will expect the ministers to respond to their concerns in detail.
The June 2003 CEC Council session in Washington, D.C.
illustrated the relative advantages of a permanent advisory committee.
The public portion of the Council session allowed a long succession of
speakers at an open microphone to address the three ministers sitting on
a raised stage before them. Although many of the interventions were
interesting and thoughtful and the ministers tried to respond in kind, the
exchange was truncated and there was no possibility of a sustained
dialogue. Later that day,'the Council members held a closed session
with JPAC. 58 The ministers sat at a conference table with the JPAC
members they had appointed, many of whom they knew or had come to
know personally. The statements by JPAC members often echoed those
made in the public session a few hours earlier, but in this meeting the
Council ministers and JPAC members were able, and even required, to
discuss the issues in more depth. Moreover, this meeting was one in a
continuing series. Council members knew that if they rejected JPAC's
recommendations, they would have to justify their decision at the next
joint meeting.
2. Public Participation in the Promotion of Compliance: The Citizen
Submissions Procedure
While JPAC offers individuals the opportunity to influence the
Council, other NAAEC mechanisms allow nongovernmental actors to
56. Id. at 202-03, 208.
57. See, e.g., id. at 201 (advising Council on how to trim programs from early CEC work
plans), 203 (reviewing and giving imprimatur to Secretariat report on controversial issue), 205
(arguing for inclusion of its representatives in high-level intergovernmental meetings on CEC
policy).
58. Members of the National Advisory Committees were allowed to observe but not
intervene.
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participate in monitoring the parties' implementation of their
commitments, especially their obligation to effectively enforce their
environmental laws. The most important of these mechanisms is the
citizen submissions procedure established by Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC, which allow any nongovernmental organization or person to
file a submission with the Secretariat claiming that a party is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental law. 9
The procedure is administered by the CEC Secretariat, which
reviews every submission to determine whether it meets certain criteria
and whether, in light of any response from the party concerned, the
submission warrants developing an investigative report, known as a
"factual record., 60 If so, the Secretariat requests authorization from the
Council, which may approve it by a two-thirds vote.6 1 In preparing a
59. NAAEC, supra note 14, art. 14(1), at 1488. The CEC has two other monitoring
mechanisms, each of which also provides for substantial public input. First, the Secretariat
prepares an annual report, which must include information on the actions taken by each party in
connection with its obligations under the NAAEC, including its environmental enforcement
activities, and "relevant views and information submitted by nongovernmental organizations and
persons." Id. art. 12(2), at 1487. In contrast, the CLC Secretariat is instructed only to prepare an
annual report to the Council on its own activities and expenditures. NAALC, supra note 14, art.
13(5), at 1506.
Second, Article 13 of the NAAEC authorizes the Secretariat to prepare a report on any
matter within the scope of the CEC annual program without the need for Council approval. Since
the annual program includes projects touching on an extremely wide array of environmental
issues, this language authorizes the Secretariat to report on almost any environmental topic it
chooses. Unless the Council objects by a two-thirds vote, the Secretariat may also prepare a
report on a topic outside the scope of the annual program, as long as it relates to the "cooperative
functions" of the NAAEC, which are understood to cover all of the topics covered by the
agreement except allegations of failure to effectively enforce. In preparing an Article 13 report,
the Secretariat may draw on information submitted by nongovernmental actors. NAAEC, supra
note 14, art. 13(2)(b), at 1488. Moreover, nothing prevents the Secretariat from taking into
account suggestions from nongovernmental actors in deciding whether to prepare such a report,
and in practice at least two reports appear to have been triggered by private submissions. For a
description and analysis of one of those reports, see A. Dan Tarlock & John E. Thorson,
Coordinating Land and Water Use in the San Pedro River Basin: What Role for the CEC?, in
GREENING NAFTA, supra note 53, at 217. The CLC Secretariat also has a mandate to prepare
reports, but the reports are to be prepared in accordance with terms of reference set by the
Council; nongovernmental actors have no role. NAALC, supra note 14, art. 14, at 1506.
60. Among other requirements, the submission must clearly identify the submitter and
provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission. NAAEC, supra
note 14, arts. 14(1), 15(1), at 1488. In deciding whether to request a response from the party, the
Secretariat must also consider factors such as whether the submission alleges harm to the
submitter, whether private remedies available under the party's law have been pursued, and
whether the submission "raises matters whose further study in this process would advance the
goals of this Agreement." Id. art. 14(2)(a)-(d), at 1488.
61. Id. art. 15(l)-(2), I.L.M. at 1488. The Council also decides by a two-thirds vote to make
the factual record public. Id. art. 15(7), I.L.M. at 1489. In practice, it has never decided not to
publish a factual record.
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factual record, the Secretariat takes into account not only information
submitted by the parties, but also any relevant information provided by
interested persons and JPAC, as well as any information developed by
independent experts or the Secretariat itself.62 Although this procedure
is not strictly adjudicative-its decisions are not binding, and probably
may not even conclude whether the party has failed to effectively
enforce its law-I have argued elsewhere that this type of complaint-
based monitoring is similar in many ways to adjudication between
nongovernmental actors and governments. 63 It allows private parties to
file complaints arguing that governments have violated their
international obligations, it treats the governments as parties to the
dispute, and it asks independent experts to review the complaints in
accordance with set criteria and issue reports on the issues they raise.
64
The NAALC also provides for a submissions procedure, at the
domestic rather than the international level. The NAALC does not allow
nongovernmental actors to file complaints directly with the CLC
Secretariat. Instead, it requires each government's NAO to establish a
procedure for receiving public communications concerning labor law
matters arising in the territory of the other parties to the agreement.
65
Nongovernmental actors may use the procedure to pressure
governments to raise their issues through the intergovernmental
mechanisms provided by NAALC, beginning with NAO-to-NAO
consultations, 66 and proceeding through ministerial consultations, 67 ECE
reports,68 and intergovernmental arbitration.69
The NAALC submissions procedure is thus parallel to the NAAEC
citizen submissions procedure in important respects. Both are triggered
by a nongovernmental submission, which under the NAALC may lead
to an independent investigative report by an ECE if one of the parties to
62. Id. art. 15(4), at 1489.
63. John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law:
the Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 34
(2001).
64. See id. at 58, 75. For more on the procedure, see Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire
Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 389, 394-398 (2004); and David L.
Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission Process, 12 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 545, 550-63 (2000).
65. NAALC, supra note 14, art. 16(3), at 1507. The NAALC sets out no other requirements
for the procedure, instead allowing each NAO to establish it in accordance with its domestic law.
In practice, the governments allow submissions complaining of ineffective enforcement.
66. Id. art. 21, at 1507.
67. Id. art. 22, at 1508.
68. Id. art. 23, at 1508.
69. Id. art. 29, at 1509.
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the NAALC requests, and under the NAAEC may lead to a report by
the CEC Secretariat if the Secretariat requests and two members of the
CEC Council agree. Further, in principle, any state party can take an
allegation of ineffective enforcement raised through either procedure to
formal intergovernmental dispute resolution under Part Five of the
agreements, although arbitration will be available only if the respective
Council approves the government's request by a two-thirds vote.70 The
chief difference between the two procedures is that the NAALC
procedure is administered entirely by the governments, while the
NAAEC procedure is administered by an independent international
body, the CEC Secretariat, which receives submissions directly from the
nongovernmental submitters. The NAAEC is thus post-Westphalian in
ways that the NAALC is not.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS
Together, the NAAEC and the NAALC create four mechanisms
designed to induce compliance by the parties with their obligations to
effectively enforce their domestic labor and environmental laws.
Although they have the same goal and the same parties, the mechanisms
are at three distinct points along the path from Westphalia. The most
Westphalian are the two dispute resolution procedures, which are
triggered by a government claim and may lead to an arbitral decision
opening the door to fines or trade sanctions. The NAALC submissions
procedure gives a role to nongovernmental actors to bring complaints to
a government, but leaves to the government the sole right to raise the
complaints internationally. The NAAEC submissions procedure goes
furthest, by allowing nongovernmental actors to bring their complaints
of ineffective enforcement to an impartial international body. Like the
NAALC submissions procedure, however, it leads only to a nonbinding
report.
The compliance mechanisms therefore provide a kind of natural
experiment, which sheds light on which types of international
procedures are most effective at promoting governmental compliance
with international labor and environmental obligations and, more
specifically, compliance with obligations to effectively enforce
domestic labor and environmental laws. Comparing the records of the
two citizen submission procedures with the records of the two
70. Investigative reports by ECEs and intergovernmental arbitration under the NAALC are
limited to certain types of labor issues, as described above. Supra Part II.A.4.
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traditional intergovernmental dispute resolution procedures leads to two
general conclusions: (1) that nongovernmental actors are far more
likely than governments to trigger such compliance mechanisms, and
(2) that "hard" sanctions are not always necessary for compliance
mechanisms to be effective. A comparison of the two citizen
submissions procedures with one another suggests two further
conclusions: (1) that submissions procedures are more likely to be
effective if the submissions regularly result in independent rather than
governmental reports, and (2) that governments will authorize
independent reports only if they are under continuing pressure from
independent bodies to do so.
A. Comparing the Citizen Submissions Procedures to
Intergovernmental Dispute Resolution
The traditional view of compliance, which is still shared by many
labor and environmental advocates, is that to be effective compliance
mechanisms must be able to coerce reluctant parties into changing their
behavior. In other words, they must have "teeth." Fines and trade
sanctions qualify; nonbinding reports do not. According to this view,
the two intergovernmental dispute resolution procedures should be far
more effective at promoting compliance than the two citizen
submissions procedures. In fact, when the NAALC and the NAAEC
were signed, the Clinton Administration portrayed those provisions as
the teeth necessary to ensure that the parties would effectively enforce
their labor and environmental laws.
The burgeoning field of compliance studies has shown that this
view is too limited, in at least two respects. 7' First, traditional methods
of promoting compliance rely on the willingness of one state to pursue
claims against another, something states are often reluctant to do for
fear of triggering reciprocal claims or of jeopardizing other aspects of
interstate relationships.72 Allowing nongovernmental actors to raise
claims of noncompliance may avoid this governmental bottleneck, since
they do not share the concerns that dissuade governments from acting.73
71. It is impossible in this space to do full justice to the scholarship on compliance. A good
starting point is Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International
Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538-53 (Walter
Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
72. David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International
Environinental Law, 79 IOWA L. REv. 769, 779 (1994) [hereinafter Wirth, Reexamining Decision-
Making Processes].
73. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 5, at 387.
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Second, the traditional view overlooks methods of promoting
compliance that rely on persuasion rather than coercion. Such methods
may include building the capacity of states to comply, amicably
clarifying unclear obligations, and monitoring states' performance. In
this respect, nonbinding reports may play a key role by identifying
compliance problems so that appropriate "managerial" tools may be
brought to bear on them.74 By drawing attention to a state's behavior in
violation of its obligations, the "sunshine" provided by such reports may
even directly induce the state to comply in order to avoid public
embarrassment.
The experience of the NAALC and NAAEC compliance
mechanisms supports each of these conclusions. First, the two
intergovernmental procedures have been dead letters. As of January 1,
2004, ten years after the entry into force of the agreements, no
government has brought a claim to even the first, consultative, stage
under either procedure.75 In defense of the procedures, one might note
that they are designed only to address persistent patterns of failure to
effectively enforce, and that the NAALC limits the scope of claims that
can be brought under it,76 but these points simply confirm that the
governments have never intended for the procedures to be used. Over
the same ten-year period, the citizen submissions procedures have
received seventy submissions, forty-two to the CEC and twenty-eight to
NAOs under the labor agreement. 77 Nongovernmental actors are willing
to bring the claims of ineffective enforcement that governments will not
raise.
Second, the records indicate that the reporting procedures are at
least modestly effective at promoting compliance. Jonathan Graubart
has conducted the most thorough study of the results of the labor and
environmental submissions procedures. He suggests that the procedures
can be effective in particular cases if they are used as part of a
coordinated political campaign, and describes how submitters have used
the procedures to draw media and political attention to desired changes
74. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 154-73
(1995).
75. In fact, the governments have yet to agree on the model rules of procedure to be used by
arbitral panels under the NAAEC, as that agreement requires them to do. NAAEC, supra note
14, art. 28(1), at 1491.
76. Supra Part II.A.4.
77. See Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, available at http://www.cec.org (last
visited Apr. 27, 2004); Summary of Public Communications (Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.naalc.org/english/pdf/pcommtable-en.pdf.
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in policy. He identifies labor policy changes in Mexico, in particular,
that have resulted from such campaigns, including promises by several
U.S. companies to discontinue pregnancy screening of job applicants in
maquiladoras, Mexican government pressure to allow an independent
union in Mexico to be registered, and agreement by the Mexican
government to support secret-ballot elections for union certification.78
Similarly, he argues that environmental "[a]ctivists have used NAAEC
submissions to give new momentum to stalled political and legal efforts
at home and to boost ongoing political and legal campaigns, such as
protecting fish habitat, protesting the dumping of toxic wastes, and
promoting greater biodiversity.... [M]any of the complaints have
provided additional momentum to specific environmental drives, helped
sustain activists' resolve, and pressured governmental authorities to
justify their actions publicly. The most successful submissions have
even succeeded in prompting concrete changes in behavior from the
complained-of government."
79
The success of the submissions procedures should not be
overstated. Certainly they have not resulted in wholesale improvement
in the enforcement of environmental or labor laws in North America.
For example, Kevin Gallagher has described the decline of Mexican
efforts to enforce environmental laws since NAFTA entered into
force. 80 Nevertheless, as Gallagher notes, the NAAEC submissions
procedure can offer a way to counter this trend by increasing public
attention to specific instances of government inaction.
81
Graubart's analysis of the two submissions procedures suggests
that much of their utility results from high-visibility public reports
investigating the allegations raised by the submitters. He emphasizes
that "critical to [labor] activists' success has been strong validation by
the [NAO] review body. Only one case ... with a strong finding of fault
failed to yield any meaningful results from the perspective of the
submitters. By contrast, no case with a weak or negative NAO finding
has achieved even modest results." 82 Along the same lines, the Mexican
78. Jonathan Graubart, Giving Teeth to NAFTA's Labour Side Agreement, in LINKING
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION 203, 204 (John J. Kirton & Virginia W.
Maclaren eds., 2002) [hereinafter Graubart, Giving Teeth to NAFTA].
79. Jonathan Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked "Soft Law" Agreements on
Social Values: A Law-in-Action Analysis of NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement, 6 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 425, 430 (2002) [hereinafter Graubart, Soft Law Agreements].
80. Kevin P. Gallagher, The CEC and Environmental Quality: Assessing the Mexican
Experience, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 53, at 117-24.
81. Id. at 128.
82. Graubart, Giving Teeth to NAFTA, supra note 78, at 216-17.
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attorney whose submission led to the first CEC factual record, on a
proposed pier in Cozumel, has credited the report with causing several
environmentally beneficial effects, including the creation of a natural
protected area by the Mexican government.83 Similarly, the attorney
whose submission spurred the second factual record, on the
environmental effects of hydroelectric projects in British Columbia,
says that the process generated "more focused public attention on the
issue by providing a clearer picture of what was occurring and of the
weakness of federal enforcement activities. Moreover, this public
momentum helped spur the government into instituting [a new
permitting procedure] and in giving it more sanctioning authority."84
B. Comparing the Citizen Submissions Procedures
Comparing the effectiveness of the submissions procedures is
difficult, because they concern two areas of law and policy that may
raise significantly different types of obstacles to effective enforcement.
One possible indirect measure of effectiveness is the degree to which
each procedure is attracting submissions. It seems likely that potential
submitters to either procedure conduct a similar cost/benefit analysis in
deciding whether to file submissions. Since each procedure is designed
to focus attention on alleged instances of ineffective enforcement,
presumably submitters will use it only if they believe that its
contribution to their efforts to improve governmental enforcement of
domestic environmental or labor laws outweighs the costs to the
submitters of pursuing the submission.
This measure suggests that submitters believe both of these
procedures are at least somewhat effective, since they have filed a
number of submissions with each. Many of these submissions were filed
in the first years after the procedures were established, however, when
submitters could not know how successful the procedures would prove.
After a submissions procedure has begun to develop a record, potential
submitters are likely to use it only if it has actually demonstrated its
ability to induce governmental policy changes substantial enough to
justify the time and expense required to file a submission. As a result, a
more telling measure of the effectiveness of a procedure is the number
83. Gustavo Alanis Ortega, Public Participation Within NAFTA 's Environmental
Agreement: The Mexican Experience, in LINKING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL
COHESION: NAFTA EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 183, 184-85 (2002).
84. Graubart, Soft Law Agreements, supra note 79, at 443.
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of submissions filed after submitters have had the opportunity to see its
initial results.
By this measure, the environmental procedure is turning out to be
more effective. Table 1 tracks the number of submissions filed annually
with the CEC Secretariat under NAAEC Article 14 and with the NAOs
pursuant to the NAALC. Each submissions procedure received twenty
submissions in the first five years after the agreements entered into
force. In the most recent five years, however, the CEC received twenty-
two and the labor procedure received eight. In the most recent four
years, from January 1, 2000 to January 1, 2004, the trend is even more
marked: the NAAEC procedure has received twenty submissions and
the NAALC procedure only six. 85 The NAALC procedure thus appears
to be in decline, and perhaps at risk of fading away altogether.
86
Table 1. Annual Number of Submissions Files with Each Procedure
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
With CEC 0 2 4 7 7
With NAOs 4 1 2 3 10
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
With CEC 2 6 3 5 6 42
With NAOs 2 1 2 0 3 28
The explanation for this disparity may be that labor submissions
never result in an independent investigative report, while environmental
submissions often do. As Table 2 indicates, of the twenty-eight
submissions filed under the NAALC through the end of 2003, not one
led to an ECE report. Over the same period, twelve of forty-two
submissions to the CEC were approved for a factual record, and a
thirteenth was authorized in March 2004.87
85. The figures in Table I and Table 2 are compiled from information about submissions
available at the websites of the two institutions: www.cec.org and www.naalc.org.
86. Widespread decisions not to use a submissions procedure, for whatever reason, will
ensure its ineffectiveness, since such a procedure cannot be effective if it does not receive
submissions. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 5, at 301 ("A court that is scarcely used, for
whatever reason, cannot hope to make much of a mark."). Of course, submissions might decline
over time because there are fewer violations about which potential submitters might complain,
but in light of continuing controversies over labor and environmental issues in each of the three
North American countries, that seems unlikely to be the situation in this case.
87. Council Res. 04-03, Commission for Environmental Cooperation, C/C.01/04-01/RES/03
(Mar. 12, 2004), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/02-1-ResO4-03_en.pdf.
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Table 2. Procedural Disposition of Submissions as of Jan. 1, 2004
CEC NAOs
Total Number Filed 42 28
Awaiting Procedural Decision 6 3
Rejected by Secretariat/NAO 20 5
Withdrawn by Submitter 1 4
Recommended for Ministerial Consideration 15 13
Approved for Factual Record/ECE Report 12 0
As the preceding section indicates, the utility of a reporting
procedure depends on the value of the reports it produces. To date, the
NAALC submissions have resulted only in reports by the NAOs and
referrals to the labor ministers for consultations, which typically
conclude with ineffectual agreements to address the issue at a very
general level.8s Although the U.S. NAO, in particular, regularly holds
public hearings, solicits evidence from companies and the accused
government as well as from the submitters, and issues "forceful
criticisms," in some cases "strongly validat[ing] almost all of the
allegations" in the submission, 89 government-produced NAO reports are
still likely to be considered less probing and impartial than the "harder
sunshine" of an ECE report prepared by independent experts.
90
The inability of labor submitters to obtain an ECE report helps to
explain why they seem to have lost much of their initial interest in the
procedure. Because the CEC procedure regularly produces the impartial
investigative reports that have eluded the labor procedure,
environmental submitters can use factual records to obtain additional
88. Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back - Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights
Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and
Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 689, 750 (2003) ("Settlements [as a result of ministerial consultations]
have now assumed an entrenched pattern of yet another tri-national seminar to study the problem
and benchmark best practices, even when the problem has already been fully examined, and it is
clear to all that only through domestic changes in labor law policy-and practices will compliance
with the NAALC actually occur.").
89. Graubart, Giving Teeth to NAFTA, supra note 78, at 203, 212-13. The Mexican NAO
has been much more reluctant to hold public hearings or endorse submitters' allegations, instead
suggesting only that the labor ministers consult with one another on the subject of the submission.
Id. at 213. The U.S. and Mexican NAOs have received the majority of the submissions: seven of
the nine submissions against the United States were filed with the Mexican NAO, and fifteen of
the seventeen concerning Mexico with the U.S. NAO. Of the four submissions filed with the
Canadian NAO, one is still pending, one was withdrawn, one was dismissed, and one resulted in a
public hearing and findings. See id. at 213-14.
90. See Weiss, supra note 100, at 750.
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information to support their allegations and additional publicity for their
arguments. It seems likely that environmental submitters see the reports
prepared by the CEC Secretariat as useful in ways that reports on the
labor submissions prepared by the other governments are not, and that
they are therefore more willing to continue to bring complaints of
ineffective enforcement.
It is not obvious why the environmental procedure should have
resulted in so many more independent reports. Governments are clearly
reluctant for ECE reports to examine labor issues,9 but it is not
apparent why they would be more willing for independent investigators
to examine environmental issues. They have as much control over
whether to authorize a CEC factual record as they do over whether to
authorize an ECE report. In fact, an ECE report would appear to be less
subject to governmental stonewalling, since any government may obtain
an ECE report upon request, while a CEC factual record requires the
affirmative votes of two governments on the Council. Nevertheless,
while no government has yet requested an ECE report, the CEC Council
has approved thirteen of the fifteen requests for a factual record brought
to it.
Possible explanatory factors are that: (1) allegations of ineffective
enforcement are less controversial in the environmental arena, (2) a
NAO report dissipates much of the political pressure on governments to
produce a concrete response to a submission, or (3) the NAALC
includes particular disincentives to request an ECE report, by providing
that the ECE will analyze patterns of practice by all three parties in the
enforcement of their labor standards as they apply to the particular issue
and by making clear that the ECE report is a necessary first step toward
requesting formal intergovernmental arbitration.
It seems likely, however, that a key factor is the post-Westphalian
structure of the CEC submissions procedure. While labor submissions
are made to governments that have complete discretion over whether
and how to pursue them on the international plane, environmental
submissions are made directly to an international body, the CEC
Secretariat. The NAAEC gives the Secretariat a mandate to review the
submissions objectively and to make a legal decision on whether they
warrant a factual record. This mandate takes the initial decision of
91. See id. ("Despite all of the attention focused on the long, drawn out NAALC process,
and the unfairness of its exclusion of certain labor rights from higher stages of the process, the
truth is that none of the cases are progressing, no matter what their topic. The explanation seems
to lie in the control of the process by diplomats and political appointees, who are extremely
reluctant to take cases to an ECE, even when they are eligible to do so.").
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whether an independent report is justified out of the governments'
hands. The Secretariat's impartiality and thoroughness, which it
demonstrates by its careful quasi-judicial opinions as well as its
rejection of submissions that do not meet the NAAEC criteria, lend its
recommendations added weight.92 Even if the governments express
disagreement with a recommendation, which they often do, they
evidently find it difficult to reject the recommendation entirely. Usually
even the government against which the submission is directed, which
has typically filed a response with the Secretariat arguing that the
submission should not justify a factual record, ends up voting to
authorize it.
Perhaps because of the very effectiveness of the environmental
procedure at drawing attention to alleged lapses by the governments,
however, they have often threatened to amend the procedure to take
more control over it. Environmental groups and the National Advisory
Committees have defended the procedure, but the loudest and most
important defense has probably come from JPAC, the other post-
Westphalian element of the CEC. It has regularly urged the Council to
respect the independence of the procedure and to avoid changes that
might reduce its transparency and effectiveness, and its efforts have
often been successful.
For example, in 1999 and 2000, government officials considered
changes that would have given them more control over the Secretariat's
preparation of factual records. 93 JPAC strongly opposed these proposals
and helped to convince the Council not to adopt them.94 Instead, the
Council decided in June 2000 to give JPAC a formal role in the
submissions procedure, by asking it to conduct a public review of any
issues concerning the procedure referred to it by the Council, the
Secretariat, or members of the public, "with a view to providing advice
to the Council on how those issues might be addressed. 9 5 At the same
time, the Council asked JPAC to prepare a report on the lessons learned
from the experience with the procedure up to that point. The ensuing
92. As Table 2 shows, the Secretariat has rejected a higher percentage of submissions on
procedural grounds than have the NAOs. Of the thirty-six submissions to the CEC that have
received a procedural decision, the Secretariat has rejected twenty, or fifty-six percent, whereas
the NAOs have rejected only five of twenty-five submissions, or twenty percent.
93. Wirth, Perspectives on JPAC, supra note 53, at 206.
94. Id. The National Advisory Committees to the United States and Canada also weighed
in, as did many environmental groups, and even editorial writers. See Knox, supra note 64, at 70-
73.
95. Council Res. 00-09, CEC, C/00-00/RES/09/Rev.2 (June 13, 2000), http://www.cec.org/
pubs docs/documents/index.c fm?lD=208&varlan=english.
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report recommended, inter alia, that the Council eliminate restrictions it
had previously placed on the transparency of the procedure and publish
its reasons whenever it denied a recommendation for a factual record.
96
The Council adopted those recommendations.
97
Since November 2001, a new problem has arisen: the Council has
often approved Secretariat requests for an investigative report only after
narrowing the scope of the report in ways that severely undercut its
utility. For example, the Secretariat recommended a factual record to
investigate an allegation that the U.S. government was failing to
effectively enforce a prohibition in domestic law against killing
migratory birds. Although the allegation concerned logging operations
throughout the United States, the Council instructed the Secretariat only
to investigate two specific cases identified in the submission and not to
examine the broader allegation. 98  JPAC immediately expressed
concerns about the Council's actions.99 After conducting a public review
in accordance with its June 2000 mandate from the Council, in
December 2003 JPAC "strongly recommend[ed] that Council refrain in
the future from limiting the scope of factual records presented for
decision by the Secretariat. ' 00 Again, the Council appears to have
responded to the pressure: in March 2004, it authorized a broad factual
96. JOINT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE [JPAC], LESSONS LEARNED: CITIZEN
SUBMISSIONS UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, FINAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (June 6, 2001), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/repll-e-
finalEN.PDF.
97. Council Res. 01-06, CEC, C/01-00/SR/01/Rev.3 (June 29, 2001), http://www.cec.org/
pubs-docs/documents/index.cfm?ID=523&varlan=english. See Christopher Tollefson, Stormy
Weather: The Recent History of the Citizen Submissions Process of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, in LINKING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL
COHESION, supra note 78, at 153, 169-70.
98. Council Res. 01-10, CEC, C/C.01/01-06/RES/04/Final (Nov. 16, 2001),
http://www.cec.org/pubs-docs/documents/index.cfm?ID=528&varlan=english. For an analysis of
this and three other resolutions adopted in November 2001 that similarly restrict the scope of
factual records, see David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen Submissions Process: On or Off Course?,
in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 53, at 274-77. See also Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of
the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 415,426 (2004).
99. JPAC, CEC, Advice to Council 01-09 (Nov. 30, 2001),
http://www.cec.org/pub's_docs/documents/index.cfmo?ID=527&varlan=english; see Wirth,
Perspectives on JPAC, supra note 53, at 207.
100. JPAC, CEC, Advice to Council 03-05 (Dec. 17, 2003), http://www.cec.org/
pubs.docs/documents/index.cfm?ID=1151&varlan=english. The JPAC wanted to conduct a
public review on the issue immediately after the November 2001 resolutions, but the Council
instructed it to wait until the factual records authorized by the resolutions had been completed.
See id.
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record on whether Canada has effectively enforced migratory bird
protections on logging throughout Ontario.'
0 '
The Secretariat and JPAC can protect this avenue for public
participation, but they cannot force the public to use it. The biggest
problem currently facing the CEC submissions procedure is that recent
submissions have been directed only against Canada and Mexico; no
submission concerning U.S. law has been filed since March 2000. This
discrepancy may be because U.S. domestic environmental law offers
potential submitters more avenues of redress than does Canadian or
Mexican law, or that submitters have become discouraged by the
relatively inconsequential effects of the few submissions they have
brought against the United States. This pattern may call into question
the long-term viability of the procedure, because the Canadian and
Mexican governments can be expected to resist the procedure even
more strongly if it is aimed only at them.
IV. UNLEARNED LESSONS
The differences between the NAAEC and the NAALC are not
accidental. They result primarily from divergent decisions of labor
unions and environmental organizations during the NAFTA debate.
While unions made little or no effort to influence the negotiation of the
labor agreement, several important environmental groups offered to
support NAFTA if the environmental agreement incorporated their
proposals, including their proposals for public participation.
Unsurprisingly, the governments departed from the Westphalian model
only to the degree that they felt necessary to attract political support. An
important lesson from the experience of the CEC and CLC is that the
battle to ensure effective public participation in an international
institution does not end when public participation mechanisms are
included in the institution; rather, it is just beginning. Governments that
agree to submissions procedures only reluctantly, under the pressure of
temporary public attention, may be expected to look for ways to
101. Council Res. 04-03, supra note 87. As originally filed, the submission claimed
widespread failure to protect migratory birds from logging in Ontario. In keeping with its recent
practice, in April 2003 the Council refused to accept the Secretariat recommendation for a broad
factual record; rather than reject the recommendation outright, however, the Council gave the
submitters a chance to provide additional information to support their claims. Council Res. 03-05,
CEC, C/C.01/03-02/RES/05/final (Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/Res-
Ontario-Logging-en.pdf. Even after the submitters provided more detailed information, many
observers feared that the Council would again refuse to authorize a broad factual record, and
would instead direct the Secretariat to investigate only individual allegations in the submission.
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undermine them after they begin to operate, especially when the
procedures threaten to embarrass the governments. 'Therefore,
institutional support for the procedures, such as an independent
secretariat and a committee of experts that can serve as a watchdog over
the process, is critically important to their success. It seems probable
that the relative success of the CEC procedure is largely due to its
administration by an independent secretariat and its oversight by an
international advisory committee, which have supported it against
governments' attempts to undermine it.
Another important lesson is that public participation may be more
important to the success of an international institution than the
theoretical possibility of government-triggered sanctions for failure to
comply. In the areas of labor and environment, governments will rarely
if ever bring claims against one another. Procedures that depend on such
claims are worse than useless, no matter how apparently strong their
sanctions, since they distract attention from more effective compliance
mechanisms and opportunities for cooperation.
Labor and environmental advocates do not seem to have learned
these lessons. The 2000 U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement and the
2003 U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement are typical of recent U.S.
bilateral trade agreements. Although both include obligations to
effectively enforce domestic laws that echo the provisions of the
NAAEC and the NAALC, and subject the obligations to dispute
resolution backed by sanctions, they either say nothing about citizen
submissions (Jordan) or adopt the NAALC model (Chile). 10 2 Nor does
either include a joint public advisory committee or an independent
secretariat. Although they have been applauded by some advocates
dazzled by the possibility of sanctions, the agreements' commitments to
ensure effective enforcement are likely to prove empty.
A more recent agreement, the Dominican Republic-Central
America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), signed in
August 2004, is a half-step back in the right direction. Like the earlier
agreements, it requires the parties to effectively enforce their labor and
environmental laws, provides for government-triggered trade sanctions,
and includes a labor submissions procedure following the NAALC
102. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, arts. 18.2, 18.4, 19.2, 19.4, 22.16. (June 6,
2003), available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/chileFTA/FTAtext.htm; Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free
Trade Area, arts. 5, 6, 17 (Oct. 24, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002), available at
http://www.Jordanusfta.com/free-tradeagreement-text-en.asp.
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model. 10 3 The environmental provisions, however, return to the CEC
approach, by allowing submissions to be filed with a secretariat that can
recommend factual records. 10 4 The future of the procedure is uncertain,
however, because the DR-CAFTA is unclear on whether the secretariat
will really be international or independent and because the agreement
does not create a joint public advisory committee.'
0 5
The failure of labor and environmental advocates to convince
governments to include stronger submissions procedures and public
advisory committees in recent trade agreements is unfortunate. Despite
the weaknesses of the CEC model, it is far more likely than the chimera
of government-triggered sanctions to induce governments to enforce
high labor and environmental standards. Governments are increasingly
willing to provide for such Westphalian sanctions, secure in the
knowledge that they will never be triggered. Meanwhile, labor and
environmental advocates are missing opportunities to extend the far
more useful post-Westphalian procedures pioneered by the CEC.
103. See Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement, (Aug.
5, 2004), arts. 16, 17, at http://www.ustr.gov [hereinafter DR-CAFTA].
104. Id. arts. 17.7, 17.8.
105. The DR-CAFTA states that the body that receives the submissions will be a "secretariat
or other appropriate body ... that the Parties designate." Id. art. 17.7(1). One important advance
over the NAAEC, however, is that as drafted, CAFTA would allow the secretariat to prepare a
factual record if any party instructs it to do so. Id. art. 17.8(2).
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